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The American Society of Transplantation (AST) and
American Society of Transplant Surgeons (ASTS)
convened a workshop on June 2–3, 2014, to explore
increasing both living and deceased organ donation in
the United States. Recent articles in the lay press on
illegal organ sales and transplant tourism highlight the
impact of the current black market in kidneys that
accompanies the growing global organ shortage. We
believe it important not to conflate the illegal market
for organs, which we reject in the strongest possible
terms, with the potential in the United States for
concerted action to remove all remaining financial
disincentives for donors and critically consider testing
the impact and acceptability of incentives to increase
organ availability in theUnited States. However, we do
not support any trials of direct payments or valuable
considerations to donors or families based on a
process of market-assigned values of organs. This
White Paper represents a summary by the authors of
the deliberations of the Incentives Workshop Group
and has been approved by both AST and ASTS Boards.
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Introduction
It has been estimated that by 2015 over 700 000 Americans
will have end stage renal disease and over 26 million will
have some form of chronic kidney disease; those are
numbers that continue increasing (1). Kidney transplanta-
tion is the most effective therapy for kidney failure, the
ultimate outcome for many with chronic kidney disease (2).
Its benefits include significantly better quality of life, fewer
medical complications, and longer survival; it is also
substantially less costly than the only alternative, long-
term dialysis. For healthcare in the United States,
successful transplantation means savings of perhaps $10
billion/year (approximately $55 000/year for the life of every
functioning transplant).
Unfortunately, our current system of organ donation is not
meeting the growing demand. The list of active patients
waiting for kidney transplants is now over 75 000, yet
we will transplant less than 17 000 this year (http://optn.
transplant.hrsa.gov/data/). The average wait for a kidney
transplant has risen to almost 5 years (much longer in some
parts of the country); about 4000 patients die waiting on the
list each yearwithmore removed from the list because their
health status has deteriorated to the point that they are too
sick to withstand transplantation. Moreover, recent studies
clearly demonstrate that the longer a patient is on dialysis
before transplantation, the greater the risk of complications
and death following transplant.
Recent articles in the lay press on illegal organ sales and
transplant tourism (3,4) highlight the impact of the current
black market in kidneys that accompanies the global organ
shortage. However, we believe it important not to conflate
the illegal market for organs, which we reject in the
strongest possible terms, with the potential in the United
States for concerted action to remove all remaining financial
disincentives for potential donors and critically consider
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testing the impact and acceptability of incentives to
increase organ availability in the United States.
Rationale and Underlying Principles
The potential for financial incentives to increase organ
donation, and ethical considerations that might accompany
their implementation remains a controversial topic, fraught
with confusion and misunderstanding, and with global
implications. Given the growing organ shortage and the
evolving discussion of these issues, leadership of both the
American Society of Transplantation (AST) and American
Society of Transplant Surgeons (ASTS) agreed to convene a
workshop to develop a policy statement, acceptable to both
societies, on the potential of creating incentives for organ
donation in the United States On June 2–3, 2014, 38
representatives of the two societies (including experts in
medical ethics, economics, and health care law and policy)
assembled in Chicago to explore the potential of incentives
to increase both living and deceased organ donation. The
organizers emphasized that defining a consensus on
incentives in transplantation was beyond the scope of
this workshop, and though the operational focus of the
workshop was on kidney transplantation, principles devel-
oped should be applicable to other solid organs (i.e. heart,
liver, lung) where incentivizing in the realm of deceased
donors is a relevant consideration as well.
The Incentives Workshop Group (IWG) began with the
premise that the AST and ASTS should have a shared
approach for modifications in public policy regarding a
topic as controversial as incentives in organ donation. This
premise derived from conflicting articles in the medical
literature and op-ed pages of major US publications that
have repeatedly called attention to the limitations of the
organ donation system in our country. Indeed, many
economists and health policy experts have considered
the growing waiting list as a failure of altruistic approaches
to organ donation, promoting not only incentives but also
various market-based solutions to remedy the prob-
lem (5,6). Alternatively, others have raised concerns
that, beyond ethical implications, any implementation of
incentives based on the logic of markets and commodities
could threaten the function and future of the altruistic
system that is currently the foundation of organ donation (7).
However, the organizers recognized that there remains a
lack of real-world evidence at this time that market-based
solutions would be effective or that concerns for damaging
altruistic donation would be borne out. Thus, the Workshop
did not begin with any assumption on whether incentives of
any kind were good or bad policy. The AST and ASTS
leadership agreed that the societies needed to consider all
sides, the potential of change and construct a shared policy.
Another underlying premise was that deliberations would
be limited to the context of what might be appropriate in
the United States, independent of global considerations.
The AST and ASTS support the ethical underpinnings of the
Declaration of Istanbul, as well as those of the more recent
Doha Convention. We have the advantage in the United
States of a well-developed system of altruistic living and
deceased donor organ donation, stable government
and rule of law, and a health system able to ensure
autonomy of the individual. Thus, proper controls are in
place to meet the requirements of the recent Manila
statement regarding proposed standards for an acceptable
system of incentives (8). There also appears to be sufficient
awareness of the limitations of the current system,
including morbidity and mortality on the waiting list,
and willingness by the American public to consider new
strategies in parallel to ongoing and strong support for
the current altruistic system.
The Chicago meeting included plenary lectures on the
history and current context of the debate on incentives in
organ donation, economic rationales, ethical challenges,
and the legal framework existing at both state and federal
levels that must be considered in formulating any position
and strategy. Five working groups with appropriately
balanced expertise met separately to discuss the current
landscape in the United States, possibilities and the
challenges of incentives for living donation and deceased
donors, the ethics and economics of incentives, and
possible operational strategies for implementation. Work-
ing group summaries were then presented to the broader
group for deliberations involving all attendees.
It is not the purpose of this report to detail the discussions
nor the pros and cons presented. The ethical arguments
on both sides of the issue are well documented in the
literature, ranging from market-based approaches to
impassioned defenses of a purely altruistic system (see
Suggested Readings; [9–19]). The remainder of this article
will briefly describe what the IWG discussed and then
presented to the leadership of ASTS andAST as the basis of
a shared approach for guidingmodifications to public policy.
An Arc of Change for Living Donors:
Starting With Removing Disincentives to
Living Donation
The overarching theme that emerged from this Workshop
was that challenges of considering any form of incentives
for organ donation should be viewed as a series of decisions
to be made along an ‘‘arc of change.’’ This arc begins with
optimization of the current system, but should proceed
rapidly to identify and remove existing disincentives
that impede the organ donation process. Removing
disincentives should be the immediate priority.
The debate regarding implementation of any incentives
is limited by vague semantics: one person’s incentive
(provision of health insurance for donors) is another’s
removal of disincentive (lack of consistent access to
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post-donation healthcare). In the near term, an operational
process of removing disincentiveswould help definewhere
the line now exists in the United States, and the potential
impact of incentives to be better defined. Additionally, the
line between incentives and removing disincentives must
also be determined by existing medical practices, ethics,
health policy and law including the National Organ
Transplant Act passed by Congress in 1984 (20). This line
would also be defined by the attitudes of the American
public. Engaging the public in consideration of the potential
of incentives to increase organ availability was recognized
as an important task for both Societies. A shared statement
on the current state of the field and the potential for
incentives was considered a good start. Developing an
operational plan together to address the challenges should
follow.
The IWGconsidered a number of elements in the context of
identifying and removing disincentives for living organ
donation that potentially test where the line with providing
incentives may lie. First, living donation is associated with
financial costs to all donors. Furthermore, NOTA specifically
states that donor reimbursement for travel, housing and
lost wages does not fall under the prohibition of ‘‘valuable
consideration’’ for an organ (42 USC 274e). While it is often
assumed that expenses for living donors are fully reimburs-
able today, this is not the case. A major limitation is the lack
of mechanisms and the necessary funding to accomplish
the task of fully reimbursing donors for expenses allowable
under NOTA. The ASTS, in collaborationwith the University
of Michigan (Drs. Akinlolu Ojo and Robert Merion) and the
Health Resources Services Administration (HRSA), created
the National Living Donor Assistance Center (NLDAC) in
2007 (https://www.livingdonorassistance.org; [21]). This
resource processes submitted requests for reimburse-
ments of justified costs and is highly effective. While
participation in the program is limited (less than 10% of
prospective beneficiaries participate), a survey of 493
donors that did participate found that approximately 75%
(370) could not have donated without this support. The
NLDAC process is also means-tested, requiring documen-
tation that the donor or recipient has an income below a
threshold set at 300% of the current poverty line. The IWG
recognized that many potential donors with incomes
significantly above the poverty line, even at the median
national income of $50 000 per year, are still challenged to
consider a major surgery and loss of income without
support. The IWG agreed that continued efforts by both
Societies are necessary to support and expand the mission
and funding of the NLDAC, potentially enabling removal of
means-testing and broader application so that no donor
assumes financial risk in the process.
Beyond compensation of out of pocket travel expenses is
reimbursement for lost wages. The IWG agreed that there
is no substantial ethical impediment to such compensation.
An issue that will require more discussion is whether such
reimbursement should be linked to an income threshold,
with a review process to determine the validity of individual
requests. Some reasoned that on purely ethical grounds, if
reimbursement of lost wages is appropriate then anyone
should be eligible. Others took a pragmatic position that at
some income level such reimbursement would be viewed
as unnecessary in the context of the currently limited
resources available. Continued efforts to have American
businesses cover lost wages of employee-donors should
also be supported through renewed efforts towards
widespread adoption of the Family Leave Act (22). Opera-
tionally, the next step should involve an outreach to HRSA
to determine if they would expand the current scope of
NLDAC to include this function. The ultimate objective
would be to expand NLDAC as a new public/private
partnership of HRSA, private payers and both societies
that could be the mechanism for evaluating and distributing
different kinds of compensation to donors. This objective
also recognizes and seeks the engagement of the many
groups that are now stakeholders in the success of organ
donation and transplantation in the United States.
Beyond that which is specifically permitted by NOTA,
the IWG discussed other means that ‘‘might’’ be legally
acceptable. It was suggested that a system where living
donors that agreed to donate to strangers currently at the top
of the waiting list would then have a lifetime ‘‘credit’’ to
move a relative or loved one to the top of the list for a
deceased donor organ later should it become necessary.
Increasing living donation bymaking it possible for donors to
invest in the future by providing expedited transplants for
their families or closest friends that are not presently ready
for transplantation,would alsobe the typeof incentive that at
aminimumwould not increase costs to the system andmay
actually result in significant cost savings by transplanting
higher risk patients more efficiently. The IWG considered
this an appealing form of incentive. Being in-kind and non-
commercial, it should not constitute a valuable consideration
prohibited by NOTA. It would also be logical for the OPTN to
implement and regulate. Preliminary data indicates that this
system of reciprocity in Israel, also referred to as ‘‘reciprocal
altruism’’ (4,23) has been temporally associated with
increased rates of deceased donor registration and trans-
plantation. Moreover, the recent changes to Israel’s laws
included removal of certain disincentives for living donation
that also enhanced donation rates.
An important disincentive is the potential for long-term
donor health risk; one now generally accepted as requiring
follow-up medical care for life. The IWG discussed the
importance of mitigating lifetime risk of kidney disease
in donors by increasing access to health insurance and
medical care. In many countries with universal health
insurance, this is not amajor issue. But it is a very significant
one for theUS. Beyond simple lack of coverage, and even in
the face of the provisions of the new Affordable Care Act,
there remain costs involved in maintaining health insurance
and limitations in what different policies cover in terms of
health maintenance. Though many donors are covered by
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their own insurance, the Societies should initiate discus-
sions with private commercial payers to ensure monitoring
and treatment of end stage organ disease and transplanta-
tion if necessary. Might lifetime insurance coverage cross
the line from removing a disincentive to an overt incentive?
The IWG noted that the Declaration of Istanbul implies such
coverage as an essential part of an ethical living donor
program. Would such an increase in the total cost of organ
transplantation be viewed as justified or sustainable to
critics? Arguments were considered on the high costs of
treating end stage organ failure to the United States health
care enterprise and the significant savings achieved with
successful transplants. Therefore, the IWG supported the
investigation of different models of providing or supple-
menting donor health insurance, with consideration of
how this could be supported, financed and extended
successfully. Possibilities discussed included tax incen-
tives, public/private partnerships with CMS and payers and
even philanthropic efforts.
The IWG also discussed the potential of compensation for
dislocation from family in cases where donors travel to
distant centers and the potential for consideration due to
discomfort and pain from organ donation surgery. It was
noted that courts and juries in cases of alleged injuries,
malpractice and faulty products already consider these
elements in settlement decisions. Finally, the IWG
discussed potential compensation for direct risks involved
in living organ donation including exposures to iodine dyes,
radiation, anesthesia, and various drugs as well as indirect
risks such as limitations on future employment due to
having a single kidney. Further compensation for increased
risks secondary to the increase risks for developing kidney
disease in the future, such as younger donors that would
simply live longerwith a single organ,might develop obesity
or diabetes only much later in life linked to familial risk
factors or changing social circumstances that cannot be
foreseen or potentially increased risks in people of African
dissent were also discussed. While there was agreement
that these are all legitimate risks of organ donation, the IWG
realized that actual practice of providing compensation for
these recognized risks would probably cross the line from
removing disincentives to consideration of incentives.
An Arc of Change for Living Donors:
Exploring Incentives
By the end of themeeting, it was agreed that though donors
assume medical risk and, in most cases, the financial costs
associated with donation, everyone else involved in the
organ transplant process (recipients, physicians, hospitals,
and associated professionals) benefits, most often finan-
cially. Might changing this dynamic encourage more
potential donors to become actual donors? Thus, the IWG
consideredwhether some kind of paymentsmight bemade
to donors as honorariums. But the IWG realized that the
challenge would be to determine how compensation for
such risks could be operationalized. Simply paying out
money to donors based on some schedule of increasing
risks was unlikely to be acceptable at this time and the legal
framework for such a practice is uncertain. However,
starting the process of establishing a consensus on the
relative risks of living donation was considered to be a good
first step and consistent with the growing imperatives to
optimize the safety of living organ donation.
Might the process be as simple as direct payment to
donors? The IWG voiced no support for direct payment
from recipients to donors. However, it may not be
unreasonable to consider third party payments adminis-
tered to living donors by a regulated entity with recovered
organs allocated according to waiting list priority. The IWG
concluded that such a move would represent a significant
change in the practices of the current field that would
require the understanding and buy-in of our patients,
families and the American public.
However, there was no a priori reason not to work forward
along the arc of change described above toward a plan for
pilot projects in offering incentives now. Such pilot projects
must be designed to test specific assumptions on the
impact and efficacy of innovative ways to increase organ
donation in real clinical practice. Legal opinion on how
this would work within NOTA remains unknown and will
require additional consultations with legal and public policy
experts. However, if necessary to support pilot projects
now, changing or modifying NOTA as a partnership with
congressional partners should not be viewed as an
insurmountable problem but rather as a worthy effort by
both societies. As part of this process, we also need to
closely track the evolution of attitudes among our fellow
professionals, ethicists, patients and the American public
that would be expressed in terms like repugnance and by
ethical and possibly legal objections. Ultimately, the extent
to which disincentives are removed and incentives are
implemented will be dependent upon society’s comfort
as we traverse the ‘‘arc of change.’’
Incentives in Deceased Organ Donation
The challenges of offering incentives to increase organ
donation from deceased donors were also considered in
detail. The IWG recognized that the legal interpretation of
NOTA was going to be a critical issue and specifically how
to interpret the term ‘‘valuable consideration’’ for donation
of an organ that is specifically prohibited in the legislation.
The IWG also felt that sensitivity to the scope and definition
of NOTA regulations would be consistently greater for
deceased donors and that is the primary reason for more
attention given here to the above discussions of moving
along the arc of change in living donation.
A key point is that deceased donation represents a practice
where the families are not directly benefiting from the
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increased health and productivity of the organ recipients
that is clearly gained by their ‘‘gift.’’ The IWG did not want
to propose anything that might interfere with the spirit of
altruism at the core of our nation’s deceased donation
system. Concerns were raised and discussed on the
potential damage that might result from trying to negotiate
the value of a donated organ. Thus, there was agreement
that simple cash payments or equally direct forms of
monetary compensation are prohibited by NOTA and the
term, valuable consideration and were not desirable.
However, we recognized that certain costs specifically
added for deceased organ donation might fall outside
of ‘‘valuable consideration’’ and be acceptable. We
also recognized that several such proposals have been
described and discussed over the years as a foundation.
These include payments of certain hospital costs related to
donation, as well as coverage of any costs that the organ
donation process might impose on the families such as
increased funeral costs. These might even be considered
under the heading of removing disincentives and not adding
incentives.
But the IWG also entered into frank discussions of what
kind of monetary value could be placed on a deceased
donor organ and how that could be justified by market
principles as having meaningful impact on changing the
success of the current organ donation system. These
discussions involved several noted economists who
explained the contrasts working in a free market between
the supply of goods and services based on costs and
demands. If the organ is supposed to be given away free to
the benefit of others in the setting of high demand and
limited supply, the market has little incentive to increase
supply. The IWG also considered that there were ample
precedents in the economic and legal fields that could
be used to determine an organ’s value if that was now
considered desirable by the field. Thus, the IWGagreed that
we should initiate the discussions with congressional
leaders and health law experts to better understand what
is possible nowwithin the language of NOTA. However, as
with living donation, it was also agreed that we need to
learn what might be possible with a purposeful revision of
NOTA to address these issues and potentially increase
deceased organ donation. This better understanding will
contribute to further discussions of the potential for pilot
projects of incentives for deceased organ donation.
However, it must be emphasized again that the IWG felt
that proposing any changes that could negatively impact
our current altruistic deceased donation system would
continue to be very sensitive, any unintended negative
impacts must be prevented and any steps in this direction
would require much more discussion in the field.
A Path Forward
In conclusion, the IWG agreed that there was an actionable
arc of change that could be initiated in the context of
addressing the current challenges resulting from the organ
shortage. This arc must start with a renewed focus to fully
utilize the current legal framework and remove disincen-
tives for organ donation, both living and deceased. The
principle aim should be that those donating organs for
transplantation should not be subjected to a financial
penalty in addition to donation. This work should include
assuring that processes like NLDAC are optimized,
expanded beyond current financial constraints and posi-
tioned for the future. ExpandingNLDAC into a public/private
partnership would be a mechanism of expanding the
available resources and provide a means to reimburse
allowable expenses for all donors. That expansion should
be discussed with HRSA and other stakeholders in organ
transplantation including the commercial payers that also
benefit greatly from successful transplants. Moving further
along the ‘‘arc of change,’’ any innovation will demand
attention to differentiating between removal of a disincen-
tive versus providing an incentive. It is often uncertain and
will require an iterative process to constructively explore
tactics and processes that will enhance organ availability
for those in need, while staying within a legal and ethical
framework. Which of our current assumptions are true,
what innovations will be effective, what unintended
consequences (including impacts internationally) will be
realized and what will ultimately be acceptable in legal,
ethical, and personal terms? Answering these questions
should be the purpose of well-designed and critically
reviewed pilot projects. However, it is also important to
note that the IWG did not at this point support any trials of
direct payments or valuable considerations to donors or
donor families based on any process of market-assigned
values of organs.
The IWG understood that theWorkshop represented only a
small group of leaders selected from the AST and ASTS,
complemented by a few experts in economics, ethics and
law; it was not a consensus process. The premise remains
that the Societies need to have and operationalize a shared
approach for guiding changes to public policies to impact
the organ shortage,with a process in place to remain in step
with the evolution of medical, ethical, and public discourse
regarding a potential role for incentives. ThisWhite Paper is
intended to report multiple approaches considered by the
IWG to inform the members of both societies. The final
shared approach to guiding changes in policy will necessar-
ily be the work product of the AST and ASTS Boards.
Consensus on such a shared approach will then require a
deliberate effort to engage the many different stake-
holders, consider their views, and refine our positions
and our plans. During that consensus-making process, we
should be working together along the arc of change to
remove remaining disincentives, explore opportunities to
either change or modify NOTA, and lay the groundwork for
the next steps with our professional colleagues, experts in
economics, law and ethics, our partners in Congress and
agencies responsible for US health policy and the American
public.
Workshop on Incentives for Organ Donation
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